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ful" conduct theory and the analogy to public welfare offenses, and
of allowing the common law mistake of fact defense. In this
manner, past precedents on the issue of intent could be overruled.
The legislative approach is applicable because under the present
classification, the age limit of twelve reasonably corresponds to
the purpose of the law and a declaration by the legislature that mistake of age will not be given credence would be appropriate. During
the prohibited period of twelve to sixteen, the legislature has already recognized the consequences of the "at peril" doctrine and
tempered it by requiring that it must be the female's first intercourse. This requirement will not always be sufficient to protect the
male from injustice. To alleviate any possible injustice, the legislature could declare that intent is a necessary element or that mistake of age is to be a defense of this offense.
Punishment at the discretion of the court does not minimize the
fact that the defendant is branded a felon, which in many cases is
an unnecessary attribution of guilt to individual defendants and an
irrational response by a society which cannot realistically expect to
derive any general deterrence thereby.
DAVID A. IRVIN
Insurance-Insurer's Liability for Injuries Intentionally Inflicted by
Insured by Use of Automobile
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts,' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a person injured by one insured under a
"compulsory" or "asigned risk" automobile liability insurance policy
issued under the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act of 19532 could recover from the insurer, notwithstanding the fact that the insured had intentionally inflicted
the injury by assault and battery. The insurer disclaimed liability
on three bases: that the coverage extended only to those persons
injured as the result of an "accident ' 3 and that injuries resulting
1261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
3

The term "accident" has been defined as follows:
An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an
undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event .... Hence .... an undesigned
and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; a
mishap resulting in injury to a person or damage to a thing; a casualty....
* . .

an unexpected happening not due to any negligence or malfeasance

of the party concerned.
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from an intentional tort are not "accidentally sustained" ;4 that an
exclusionary clause in the policy provided that an assault would be
considered an accident unless committed by or at the direction of
the insured; and that public policy precluded indemnifying an insured
against the consequences of his own intentional acts. The court
followed the decisions of other compulsory insurance states 5 and
the more widely accepted view that an assault constitutes an "accident" within the coverage of automobile liability insurance.6
The assault was an accident, reasoned the court, from the viewpoint of the injured person if not from that of the insured.' It thus
placed North Carolina in accord with the majority of jurisdictions
that have decided this issue.8 As the basis for this view, the court
(2d ed. 1959). The standard
liability policy usually defines it as an undesigned or unforeseen occurrence
of an afflictive or unfortunate character, resulting in bodily injury to a
person other than the insured. See, e.g., Raven Halls, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Misc. 454, 254 N.Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
'In Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956),
it was held that one injured as the result of assaulting or voluntarily entering
into a affray with another has not suffered an "accident" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy. In order for an injury to have been an
WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

accident it must have been unforeseen. E.g., Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428,

53 S.E.2d 668 (1949).
'Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E.2d 544 (1937); Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948).
'Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying
Louisiana law); Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d
117 (4th Cir. 1946) (applying West Virginia law); New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) (applying Michigan law);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948);
Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964);
Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952); Wendell
v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331 (1963); Wisconsin
Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d 708 (1942).
"If looked at from the viewpoint of the insured, the obvious conclusion
would have been that there was no "accident" because the occurrence would
not have been unexpected or unforeseen, as is set out in the definition of
that term. See note 3 supra.
'The following jurisdictions have elected to look at the occurrence from
the viewpoint of the injured person: Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Louisiana law); Huntington Cab Co. v.
American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1946) (applying West
Virginia law); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.
1943) (applying Michigan law); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss.
853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H.
40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948); Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J.
220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C.
285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964); Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53
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applied the provisions and underlying purpose of the North Carolina compulsory act to the terms of the policy.' It found:
The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to compensate innocent victims who have been injured
by financially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose is not, like
that of ordinary [voluntary] insurance, to save harmless the
torifeasor himself. Therefore, there is no reason why the victim's
right to recover from the insurance carrier should depend upon
whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or negligent.
In order to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective...
must be that of the victim and not ...

the aggressor. 10

This rationale was also used by the court in deciding that the
"assault and battery" exclusionary clause" contained in the liability
policy did not control. It reasoned, in effect, that since the compulsory act is in itself a declaration of the policy that innocent victims
should be compensated, any provision in a liability policy to the
contrary would contravene the purpose of the act and therefore be
invalid.'"
In order to resolve the question concerning public policy against
indemnifying an intentional tortfeasor, the court used the reasoning
as applied to the first question' 8 and also a specific provision of the
compulsory act.' 4 This section contains an authorization for a provision in each liability policy requiring the insured to reimburse the
N.W.2d 508 (1952); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294,
187 A.2d 331 (1963); Wisconsin Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241
Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d 708 (1942).
The following jurisdictions have elected to look at the occurrence from
the viewpoint of the insured: Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer,
177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950) (applying
Virginia law); Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932) (but
only as to voluntary insurance); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118
Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331 (1963) (but only as to voluntary insurance).
:N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
10261 N.C. at 290-91, 134 S.E.2d at 659.
11
The policy in Roberts provided that "an assault will be considered
an accident unless committed by or at the direction of the insured." Id. at
290, 2134 S.E.2d at 658-59.
Id. at 290, 134 S.E.2d at 659. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden
Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Howell v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
237 N.C. 227, 74 S.E.2d 610 (1953).
"8See text accompanying note 10 supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963), which provides that
"any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured shall reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance carrier would
not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the
provisions of this article."
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insurer for any payment made by the latter for which it would not
have been obligated under the terms of the policy but were, nevertheless, required to be made because of the provisions of the act.
By this reasoning, assuming the insured is not insolvent, the argument against allowing recovery is at once shown to be ill founded15
as the ultimate burden of payment will remain on him and not the
insurer.'1
As stated, Roberts followed the majority rule in allowing recovery under a compulsory policy." In regard to voluntary policies,
however, the court had previously placed North Carolina in the
minority by denying recovery for intentional injuries inflicted by the
insured.' 8 This result was reached in Jackson v. Maryland Cas.
Co.,'" which was decided before the enactment of the compulsory
liability insurance provisions and therefore was based on an entirely
voluntary policy. However, Jackson has been modified to some extent by the compulsory insurance provisions. After the adoption
of compulsory insurance, Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.20 announced the rule, which was reiterated in Roberts, that all policies
are compulsory up to the statutory requirements and only the excess is voluntary. 21
Thus, if an insured goes beyond compliance with the compulsory
"*This rationale was not heavily relied on by the court. If the insured
is obligated to reimburse the insurer and is in fact financially able to do so,
allowing initial recovery from the insurer results in a possible circuity
of action.
" Prior to the enactment of the compulsory liability insurance laws in
North Carolina, if the insured failed to cooperate, failed to give the insurer
notice of the accident, failed to aid the insurer in the manner provided for
by the policy, or was guilty of an intentional tort, neither the insured nor the
injured party would be allowed to recover. See, e.g., Peeler v. United States
Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929). After the enactment of the
compulsory law this result was overruled so that the injured party was no
longer bound by the provisions in the policy setting out the insured's duties
with respect to the insurer. The result today is that if the insured fails to
cooperate with the insurer, the insurer can seek reimbursement from him.
See, e.g., Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960).
See notes 5 & 6 supra.
For cases representative of the minority, see Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
914 (1950) (applying Virginia law); Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181
N.E. 182 (1932); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429,
161 N.E. 278 (1928); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294,
187 A.2d 331 (1963).
19212 N.C. 546, 193 S.E. 703 (1937).
"0253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
21
1d. at 127, 116 S.E.2d at 487 (1960).
1

18
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act and insures, for his own protection, in excess of the required
amount, the insurer would be liable under Roberts up to the amount
required by the compulsory act. But the Jackson rule would preclude liability beyond that amount.2 2
The next logical step from Roberts may well be to hold an
insurer liable for punitive damages within the same limits. Generally, punitive damages are allowed when a tortfeasor is guilty
of gross negligence, of an intentional or deliberate tort, or of conduct evincing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests
of others.23 Such conduct is usually described as willful, wanton,
reckless, or intentional-i.e., the type of conduct for which compensatory damages were held recoverable in Roberts. Punitive damages
are justified on the theories that they punish the wrongdoer as well
as deter him and others from similar wrongdoings.2 4
Using these general rules as a basis, the insurer may advance the
following argument in an attempt to avoid liability for punitive
damages: For such damages to deter, the burden of payment must
remain on the wrongdoer; by allowing recovery on the policy, the
burden would ultimately be shifted to the premium-paying public.
If a jurisdiction is committed to the general rule that punitive
damages are awarded to punish the tortfeasor, the argument set
out above for disallowing such damages would apparently have some
merit if the burden of payment would be borne by the insurer and
premium-paying public. This result, however, is not necessary in
North Carolina because of the provisions of the compulsory act.21
The North Carolina statute authorizes a provision in every liability
policy that the insured reimburse the insurer for payments made by
it as required by the act but not by the terms of the policy.20 By
this provision, assuming the insured was solvent, the ultimate burden
of payment would remain on the tortfeasor.
If this argument against the allowance of punitive damages is
"2Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1(10) (Supp. 1963), the result
would be that the insurer is liable up to $5000 for injuries to one person;
up to $10,000 for injuries to two or more persons; and up to $5000 for
property damage.
" See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 87 (1897); Kirschbaum v.
Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925) ; Gostkowski v. Roman
Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 324-25, 186 N.E. 798, 800 (1933); McCoRmicIc, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
2' See PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 9-12 (2d ed. 1955).

'See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963). See note 14 supra.
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overcome, an affirmative rationale may be found in the North Carolina standard policy, which specifies that the insurer agrees to pay
"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
.. . for damages sustained by any person, caused by accident.""
Several courts have decided, without discussing the question of reimbursement, that such language is sufficient to permit the recovery
of punitive damages.28 Reimbursement, however, would appear
crucial to such a recovery in North Carolina because of its rule that
punitive damages are awarded solely as punishment.2" For the
burden of punishment to fall on the insured, a rationale for reimbursement must be found. It is doubtful that reimbursement could
occur if punitive damages were allowed under this clause of the
policy."0 While the court's liberal interpretation in Roberts could
possibly be extended to allow recovery of punitive damages, a
further argument against such recovery remains: Such recovery
has no bearing on making the injured party whole, which is the
purpose of the compulsory act.
Recovery of punitive damages up to the compulsory amount of
liability insurance may have three adverse results. First, if the insured is solvent and reimburses the insurer, the former bears the
burden of the award-just as he would if he initially satisfied the
judgment. Since the insurer may have to take action to be reimbursed, a circuity of action is possible. Second, where the insured
is insolvent, the insurer and the premium-paying public must bear
the burden. Third, if the recovery is upon an assigned risk policy
and the insured is insolvent, an anomaly results: To enable the
insured to operate a vehicle on the public highways, he was assigned
to an insurer who in turn must pay damages designed to punish
the insured for his willful misuse of the highways. A greater
.7 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C.
285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
28 See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v.Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th
Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel,
230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky.
296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947).
20
E.g., Waters v. Western Union Tel. Co., 194 N.C. 188, 196, 138 S.E.
608, 612 (1927).
"Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963), a policy may
provide for reimbursement of "any payment the insurance carrier would not
have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the
provisions of this article." Thus, for reimbursement to occur, an award of
punitive damages would have to be based on the act, not the policy itself.
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punishment would be achieved by denying such a person the use
of the highways and thus sparing innocent victims in the first
place. But, however desirable, such a law would be indeed difficult
to contrive.
RICHARD L. BURROWS
Investment Company Act-Procedure--Demand on Shareholders
The Investment Company Act of 1940' is a statutory attempt
to regulate the internal structure and business conduct of investment companies. It specifically authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate violations,2 issue orders,3 and
seek injunctions. 4 A private right of action by the shareholder is not
specifically authorized. The case of Levitt v. Johnson5 faced squarely
for the first time the problem of the source of the law to be applied
in a private suit under the act.
'54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80a (Supp. V, 1963).
2

54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).

54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-39 (1958).
' 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), reversing 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass.
1963). The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, brought a derivative suit under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, against the directors of the Fidelity
Capital Fund, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, on behalf of himself and
other stockholders. The allegations generally were that the directors had
paid excessive fees that constituted a waste of corporate assets. As to the
condition precedent of making a demand on shareholders, the plaintiff alleged
as excuse for failure to make demand that
the Fund has more than 48,000 stockholders scattered all over the United
States whose identity is subject to frequent changes. A demand upon
the stockholders to take action would cast an unconscionable financial
burden on the plaintiff in that the plaintiff would have to solicit proxies
from all of the stockholders residing in every State of the Union and
foreign countries. It would involve the conduct of a proxy fight, a proxy
fight which would entail prohibitive expenses and would cause undue loss
of time with the danger that the claims alleged might be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
222 F. Supp. at 807. The court then ruled that the Massachusetts law was to
be applied; it provides that it "is only when the complaint alleges that the
majority are corrupt or are otherwise incapable of acting in good faith that
the demand upon the body of stockholders may be excused." Id. at 812.
The circuit court reversed on the grounds that the application of the Massachusetts rule "negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role
to be played by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory
legislation." 334 F.2d at 819.

